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MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN
COMMERCIAL BANKING: ECONOMIC AND
FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS
Arnold A. Heggestad*
and John D. Wolken**
I. INTRODUCTION
The banking industry is currently experiencing the most significant
merger movement in its history. There has been a quantum jump in the
number of mergers and acquisitions in the past few years (Appendix A).
The increase in the number of mergers is even more significant because
the average size of each transaction is also increasing. The consequence
of these two trends is that in 1983 alone, over $40 billion in assets were
acquired within the commercial banking industry (Appendix B). 1 If cur-
rent trends are to continue, the consequences for profitability, increased
concentration of resources, soundness and competition in the industry
may be critical. This Article analyzes the recent merger and acquisition
movement within commercial banking. The Article considers the poten-
tial benefits to the acquiring and the acquired firms and examines the
economic, technological and public policy considerations responsible for
the phenomenal increase in merger activity.
II. THE BANKING ENVIRONMENT OF THE 1980's
The current banking environment is changing more now than it has
at any time since the 1930's. These changes include significant deregula-
tion, rapid technological development and an extremely volatile and un-
certain economy. Most of these changes have led to increased merger
activity by making it considerably more difficult for smaller firms to sur-
vive or by putting additional pressure on larger firms to continue to
grow. For example, as interstate banking is becoming more important,
regional financial institutions perceive the need to achieve a very large
* University of Florida, Department of Finance, College of Business Administration.
** Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System, and Visiting Professor, University of
Florida. The views in this paper are of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views
of the Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System.
1. S. RHOADES, MERGERS AND AcQuISITIONS BY COMMERCIAL BANKS, 1960-83, Staff
Study No. 142 (1985) (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
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size in order to compete effectively with money center banks and other
large financial institutions that are becoming active in the regional
markets.
Perhaps the single most important change that has affected commer-
cial banks is the loss of their traditional low cost deposit base. Low cost
savings deposits and demand deposits have disappeared due to the intro-
duction of new products such as money market funds and the phase out
of Regulation Q.2 This has put considerable pressure on those commer-
cial banks that relied on low cost savings and demand deposits as their
primary source of funds. As Appendix C demonstrates, the share of
these funds as a percentage of total funds has dropped tremendously.
The firms most affected, which primarily consist of small community
banks, are continuing to experience increases in the cost of their funds
and a decline in the average duration of their liabilities. If they have not
matched this position on the asset side of their balance sheet, they will
continue to face narrowing profit margins and their earnings will be
greatly sensitive to changes in interest rates.
Some evidence of the impact of these changes can be obtained by
examining bank profitability. From 1980 to 1983, at the same time that
deregulation occurred, profit margins narrowed. In 1980, the return on
assets for insured commercial banks averaged 0.79% of assets. This
same ratio equaled 0.76%, 0.71% and 0.67% in 1981, 1982 and 1983,
respectively.
A. Uncertainty in the Economy
Financial markets have become much more unstable since the eco-
nomic problems of inflation and low growth in the 1970's. Interest rates,
which have a direct consequence both on the cost of bank funds and on
bank revenue from loans and investments, have become far more volatile
since 1979. This development has increased the pressure on commercial
banks to manage their interest rate risk by matching or controlling the
net duration or maturity of their assets and liabilities.
Interest rate volatility has been increasing over time but took a
marked increase in 1979. In a recent study, Roley and Troll analyzed the
2. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 provided for
the phasing out of Regulation Q by 1986. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3501(b), 3503 (1982). The Garn-St
Germain Act of 1982 accelerated this process by removing interest rate differentials, 12 U.S.C.
§ 3503 note (1982), and creating the Money Market Deposit Account, 12 U.S.C. § 3503(c)
(1982).
3. Danker & McLaughlin, Profitability of Insured Commercial Banks in 1983, 70 Fed.
Res. Bull. 802, 803 (1984).
1166 [Vol. 18
SYMPOSIUM
volatility of the ninety day Treasury Bill rate since 1977. 4 The Treasury
Bill rate is an excellent proxy for most short term rates in the economy
because there is a very active market in T-Bills and because there is no
default risk.
The Federal Reserve shifted its approach to monetary policy on Oc-
tober 5, 1979. It adopted a "monetarist" policy that did not attempt to
control interest rates. In the three year period following this date, the
volatility of weekly changes in the Treasury Bill rate tripled in compari-
son to the two years preceding the Federal Reserve action. Of course,
the two years prior to 1979 were record years for inflation and high inter-
est rates in the economy and conditions were considerably more volatile
than in previous years.
Successful management of a financial intermediary in this environ-
ment is difficult and complex. The bank is forced to make commitments
to lend money into the future at interest rates set under the conditions
that prevail at the date of the loan. This is a risky proposition. If interest
rates increase more than expected, the bank will receive less revenue than
it would have received if it had not lent at a fixed rate. Conversely, if
rates fall, the lender is better off.
By precise and careful balancing of the maturities of its various
types of deposits with its loan and investment portfolio, the bank can
maintain some control over its interest rate exposure. If the net duration
(time adjusted maturity) of its assets and liabilities are properly balanced,
the bank is effectively protected from a change in value resulting from
changes in interest rates. Changes in the value of the asset portfolio are
matched by changes in the liability portfolio. This technique is difficult
to understand and even more difficult to apply. The calculations neces-
sary to obtain duration estimates for all assets and liabilities are complex
and time consuming.'
Most of the larger financial institutions are developing sophisticated
forms of duration management or, at a minimum, are developing the ex-
pertise to manage the sensitivity of their short run cash flows to changes
in interest rates through a technique called gap management. Smaller
financial firms are placed at a strong disadvantage in this environment.
First, they may not feel they have the requisite expertise to institute a
duration or interest rate gap matching program. Second, they have less
4. Roley & Troll, The Impact of New Economic Information on the Volatility of Short-
Term Interest Rates, in FINANCIAL INSTITuIONS AND MARKETS IN A CHANGING WORLD
271-87 (1984).
5. See Kaufman, Measuring and Managing Interest Rate Risk" A Primer, ECON. PERSP.,
Jan.-Feb. 1984, at 16-29 (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago).
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control of their assets and liabilities since their portfolios are generally
less diversified. They must meet their narrow market demand and as a
result are likely to have less discretion to manage their portfolios. Conse-
quently, their earnings are far more sensitive to changes in interest rates.6
By combining with larger firms that have more diversified asset and lia-
bility maturity structures, firms may be in a better position to reduce
their interest rate sensitivity.
Interest rate volatility, accompanied by surges in inflation and sub-
sequent deflationary periods, has placed considerable stress on several
key industries. Some of these industries, including agriculture, energy
and aircraft, are heavily indebted to commercial banks. In a similar vein,
many less developed countries, including Mexico, Argentina, Brazil and
Poland, are heavily indebted to the larger United States commercial
banks. Recently, many of these countries have had difficulty meeting
their repayment schedules. These events place considerable pressure on
many United States banks as potential write-offs exceed their loan loss
reserves and even their capital reserves.
More banks failed in 1984 than have failed in any year since 1938.
This trend has continued into 1985. Mergers may become an attractive
option to financially distressed firms prior to their ultimate failure and
dissolution by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
Moreover, a common practice by the FDIC has been to encourage merg-
ers rather than to liquidate a failed bank. Mergers may also allow firms
which concentrated too heavily in specific segments of the economy to
further diversify their loans.
B. Public Policy Towards Mergers and Acquisitions
At the same time that pressure has been building for mergers and
acquisitions, the main restrictions on these activities have been reduced,
making possible combinations that would not have been contemplated a
decade ago.
Mergers and acquisitions are limited by antitrust laws and by spe-
cific legislation, including the Bank Holding Company Act of 19561 and
Banker Merger Act.' This legislation prohibits any merger which will
lead to a reduction in competition in any line of commerce in any section
of the country. Since the analysis of the effect of a merger requires an
estimate of its future consequences, there is room for interpretation on
6. See Flannery, Market Interest Rates and Commercial Bank Profitability: An Empirical
Investigation, 36 J. FIN. 1085 (1981).
7. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1982).
8. 12 U.S.C. § 1828 & note (1982).
1168 [Vol. 18
any individual merger. The interpretation will depend on assessments by
the regulatory agencies or by the courts of the relevant lines of com-
merce, the appropriate geographic market, the competitive environment
in which firms operate, and the patterns of behavior in the industry. Re-
cent court rulings, as well as statements by the regulatory agencies and
the Department of Justice, have signalled a relaxation on the types of
mergers that would be challenged.
All bank mergers and acquisitions must be approved by the Federal
Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency or the
FDIC, depending on the charter class of the surviving institution and the
type of transaction. Similarly, all mergers of savings and loan associa-
tions must be approved by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. Fur-
thermore, the United States Department of Justice is required to
challenge within thirty days any acquisition they deem anticompetitive.
In 1982, the Department of Justice9 and the Federal Reserve
Board1" released guidelines detailing the conditions under which they
would expect a bank merger to have an anticompetitve effect, given cur-
rent legal interpretations. Mergers that exceed these guidelines are likely
to be denied.
The Federal Reserve market extension guidelines are directed at
market extension merges, and the Department of Justice guidelines are
directed at horizontal mergers. Market extension mergers involve the
combination of two banks operating in different geographic markets. For
example, the merger of two banks operating in different cities would be a
market extension merger. Horizontal mergers involve the combination
of two firms operating in the same market.
The Federal Reserve guidelines state that the Board is unlikely to
find an antitrust violation by a iy merger unless several criteria are met.
Generally, these criteria are: (1) the market is highly concentrated;
(2) there are few other potential entrants; (3) the acquiring firm is an
important probable future entrant to the market; and (4) the acquisition
is of a dominant firm in the market." Under current judicial interpreta-
9. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES (June 14, 1982),
reprinted in 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4501-4505 [hereinafter cited as DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE GUIDELINES].
10. Statement of Policy on Bank Acquisitions, 47 Fed. Reg. 9017 (1982) (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. ch. 2) (proposed Mar. 8, 1982).
11. Specifically, these criteria are: (1) the market of the firm to be acquired is highly con-
centrated (the three-firm concentration ratio of total deposits exceeds 75%); (2) there are six or
fewer other firms not operating in the market that are capable of entry; (3) the market of the
firm to be acquired is a metropolitan area and has a growth rate in deposits higher than the
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tion, unless all of these criteria are met, it is unlikely that there will be a
reduction in competition sufficient to warrant a denial.
Mergers that meet all the criteria for challenge specified by the Fed-
eral Reserve Board are rare. Most market extension mergers will fail to
meet at least one of the criteria. Consequently, the probability of an anti-
trust challenge of a market extension merger, which normally represents
a major barrier to bank mergers and acquisitions, is very low at this time.
In fact, very few have been denied.12
The Department of Justice has set up similar criteria under which it
would find a violation in a horizontal merger involving direct competi-
tors.1 3 The tests are based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as
a measure of market concentration.' 4 The guidelines are significantly
less stringent than the previous Justice Department guidelines in place
since 1968, especially in markets with low to moderate concentration.1 5
As a consequence, many mergers between two banks within their own
markets are possible now, whereas they probably would not have been
feasible only a few years ago.
In addition to a substantial relaxation of the structural standards,
the regulatory authorities have exercised greater discretion in consist-
ently approving mergers that violate the quantitative guidelines. In a re-
cent study of enforcement of the guidelines on horizontal mergers since
1982, Di Clemente and Fortier concluded that the actual threshold was
significantly higher than the stated threshold. 6 Mergers that clearly vio-
average of its state or the average of the nation; and (4) the firm to be acquired must be one of
the three largest in the market and have more than 10% of the bank deposits. Id.
12. Hawke, Fed Smiles on Holding Company Expansion in 1983, Legal Times, Jan. 16,
1984, at 11, col. 1.
13. The Department of Justice Guidelines are detailed below:
Change in HHI Level of Postmerger HHI
HHI < 1000 1000 < HHI < 1800 HHI > 1800
50 or less no challenge no challenge may challenge
50 to 100 no challenge no challenge may challenge
Over 100 no challenge may challenge challenge
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 1 4503.101.
14. The HHI is the sum of market shares squared of all firms in the market. For example,
in a market with five banks with market shares of 40%, 30%, 20%, 7% and 3% respectively,
the premerger HHI would be 2958. A merger of the two smallest firms would increase the
po.stmerger HHI to 3000. Under the Department of Justice Guidelines, such an increase of 42
would not be challenged. A merger of the largest two banks would increase the postmerger
HH to 5358. The 2400 increase would be challenged.
15. Guerin-Calvert, The 1982 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines: Applications to
Bank Mergers, IssuES BANK REG., Winter 1983, at 18.
16. Di Clemente & Fortier, Bank Mergers Today: New Guidelines, Changing Markets,
ECON. PERSP., May-June 1984, at 3 (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago).
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lated the guidelines were approved by the regulatory agencies and were
not challenged by the Department of Justice. Effectively, these decisions
gave a signal to the banking industry. Banks could consider combina-
tions that previously would have been out of the question.
17
C. Interstate Banking
The McFadden Act of 192718 and the Douglas Amendment to the
Bank Holding Company Act of 195619 limit the ability of banks to ex-
pand their banking operations into additional states. This legislation
prohibits banks from entering new states, either through direct branching
or through the establishment or acquisition of banking affiliates in other
states, unless interstate acquisitions are expressly permitted by the state.
The pressure for interstate banking legislation has been building for
the past decade. It has been recommended by regulatory authorities,
academics and by the United States Treasury. ° Many larger institutions
have created de facto interstate networks through subsidiary networks of
financial activities closely related to banking.21
Even though Congress has not yet acted, many states have taken
unilateral action to permit some form of interstate banking within their
borders. To date, twenty states have passed some form of interstate
banking legislation.2" Only a few states allow full interstate banking
while others have very restricted plans. The most popular form of inter-
17. Exceeding quantitative guidelines is in part justified by the increasing role that thrifts
and other financial institutions play in the supply of many banking services. Measures of mar-
ket structure, such as concentration ratios and Herfindahl indices based on commercial bank
deposits only, may overstate the lack of competition in banking markets, especially when there
is significant non-bank competition. Hence, it is likely that some mergers which technically
violated the merger guidelines would not have done so if the product market definition were
modified and market structure measures recalculated to reflect competition from firms other
than commercial banks.
18. 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1982).
19. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982).
20. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, GEOGRAPHIC RESTRICTIONS ON
COMMERCIAL BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES (1981).
21. Banks are allowed to expand non-bank financial activities through their holding com-
pany organizations. Consequently, there has been a considerable amount of out of state
"banking" activity in more attractive markets. Bank holding companies currently operate
trust companies, consumer and commercial finance subsidiaries and mortgage subsidiaries in
multiple states. Under current law, they may also open non-bank banks-banks that do not
meet the Bank Holding Company Act's legal definition of a bank because they either do not
hold commercial loans or do not accept demand deposits. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982). For a
survey of interstate activities, see Whitehead, Interstate Banking: Taking Inventory, ECON.
REv., May 1983, at 4, 5 (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta).
22. See Hawke, Public Policy Toward Bank Expansion, in HANDBOOK FOR BANKING
STRATEGY 381 (1985).
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state banking legislation has been the regional compact concept. States
in New England have passed legislation that permits interstate bank ac-
quisitions only by bank headquarters in that region. The southeastern
states have passed similiar legislation. This legislation has been chal-
lenged as unconstitutional, and the case will be heard by the United
States Supreme Court in 1985.
The interstate banking activity in this form has increased pressure
for merger activity. When a state is opened up to banks from another
state, the most common and often the only permitted avenue for entry is
through acquisition. At the same time, banks that do not plan to expand
interstate have an incentive to expand by acquisition within their state as
a defensive measure to meet competition and to prevent possible takeover
bids from out-of-state institutions. In fact, the stated intent of regional
compacts is to allow for large multistate companies to compete with
larger money center banks. This growth will come through mergers and
acquisitions.
D. Antitrust in an Interstate Banking Environment
If Congress were to pass full interstate banking legislation allowing
banks to enter markets in any state by acquisition, there would be little
deterrence to prevent massive acquisition movements by the largest fi-
nancial institutions. The consequences of this activity could be a com-
plete disappearance of major regional banks within some of the high
growth states. Under current judicial and regulatory interpretations, an-
titrust would have limited impact on restricting interstate acquisitions.
In an interstate banking environment, even the largest banks would com-
bine without violating the current tests for illegality.23
Interstate acquisitions would generally represent expansion into new
geographic markets and thus be considered market extension mergers.
The acquiring firm and the acquired firm would not have competed di-
rectly prior to the merger. Consequently, the antitrust analysis would
have to consider dimensions other than the elimination of direct
competition.
One ground for challenging interstate combinations is that the ac-
quisition may eliminate a probable future entrant to the market where
the acquired firm or the acquiring firm presently operate.24 If there were
23. See How the Financial System Can Best Be Shaped to Meet the Needs of the American
People, Hearings Before the Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 683, 688 (1984) (statement of Arnold A. Heggestad).
24. Rhoades, A Clarification of the Potential Competition Doctrine in Bank Merger Analy-
sis, 6 J. BANK RE EARCH 35, 37-38 (1975). For an analysis of attempts to apply this theory to
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no merger, the acquiring firm or the acquired firm may have entered the
other's markets in a more procompetitive way. Second, interstate merg-
ers could be challenged on the ground that a series of such mergers could
lead to an increase in the number of links between the major banks as
they meet in a large number of markets. A final basis for challenging
interstate combinations is that large mergers of dominant companies
could cause an undue concentration of resources. Such a challenge
would come from regulators under the authority of section 4 of the Bank
Holding Company Act25 and the Sherman 6 and Clayton Acts,27 which
are designed to stop monopoly in its incipiency.
The impact on probable future competition will most likely have
little effect as an antitrust argument. The Federal Reserve's proposed
guidelines28 require that all of the conditions be present to find competi-
tive injury. It is clear that under full interstate banking, interstate merg-
ers would violate at least one of the conditions and consequently could
not be challenged. For example, one criterion is that there must be only
a few other potential entrants. The theoretical injury to competition oc-
curs if one of only a few possible entrants is lost. Under interstate bank-
ing, there will always be a large number of potential entrants to any
major United States market.
The second ground for challenging a market extension merger is the
"multimarket links" effect.29 This theory states that if the same firms
meet each other in many different markets, they are less likely to be com-
petitive in any single market, as each must protect its interest in every
market in which it operates. A merger of two large multimarket firms
could possible increase the degree of linkage sufficiently to be found ille-
gal. The Supreme Court in United States v. Marine Bancorporation,
Inc.30 ruled that this effect must be considered but required empirical
evidence of the effect.31
For the multimarket links effect to be significant, it would be neces-
sary to show significant overlapping. Since there is now virtually no
overlapping across state lines, there would have to be a substantial
banking firms, see Austin, The Legal and Legislative History of the Line of Commerce in Bank-
ing, ECON. REv., Apr. 1982, at 12 (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta).
25. 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1982).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
28. See supra note 11.
29. See Heggestad & Rhoades, Multi-Market Interdependence and Local Market Competi-
tion in Banking, 60 Ray. ECON. & STATISTICS 523 (1978).
30. 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
31. Id. at 630-32.
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number of large mergers before this challenge successfully could be in-
voked. Even then, the empirical evidence of the multimarket links effect
is somewhat conflicting.32
The final basis for challenging interstate mergers is that they tend to
lead to undue concentration of resources. Compared to most industries,
banking is unconcentrated at the national level. It would take many
mergers before the overall concentration of banking resources becomes
high by traditional standards. For example, if Bank of America acquired
the largest banking organizations in Texas and Florida, its share of the
1982 United States domestic deposits would increase from 4.14% to
5.41%. In comparison to recent oil mergers that have passed antitrust
barriers, this increase is almost trivial. It is highly doubtful that a denial
by one of the regulatory agencies would be upheld in the courts.
In sum, the banking environment, the uncertainty economy and the
evolution toward interstate banking suggest that bank mergers will con-
tinue to play an important role in the United States banking industry. In
addition, the application of antitrust law to bank mergers in this environ-
ment suggests that these considerations will not be a significant
constraint.
The next section of the Article considers the effects of bank mergers
on the owners of some of the acquired and acquiring firms, as well as
some of the perceived benefits of mergers in banking, both from a private
and a public viewpoint.
III. MOTIVATIONS FOR MERGERS
A. Financial Elements of a Merger
The financial aspects of mergers are of critical importance in deter-
mining whether they will occur and whether they will be profitable.
Consider the acquisition of Firm B by Firm A. The acquiring firm must
make two determinations. First, it must determine the value of Firm B
as an independent entity. Second, it must consider the incremental value
of Firm B to the combined firm. This may be defined as V(AB) - V(A),
the value of the firm after its acquisition relative to its initial value.
The value of the acquired firm (V(B)) as an independent is straight-
forward if there is an active market in its stock. The value of the equity
of the firm would simply be the number of shares outstanding multiplied
by the price per share. This figure represents the present value of the
firm's expected future earnings.
32. Gilbert, Bank Market Structure and Competition: A Survey, 16 J. MONEY, CRPDrr &
BANING 617 (1984).
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If there is no active market in the firm's stock, as is the case for the
stock of most commercial banks, the determination of value is somewhat
more difficult.33 The best approach would be to estimate future earnings
and apply the appropriate discount rate to arrive at the present value of
the firm. Because of the difficulty in making earnings estimates, other
techniques for value determination are also used. For example, the value
is often estimated based upon the book value of the bank, with some
attempt to arrive at adjusted market value for assets.3 4 This process be-
comes highly subjective as specific estimates must be made of the value of
real estate and the soundness of each loan and investment. There is also
considerable variation in estimates of market value.
The final selling price that will be determined in the merger or ac-
quisition will depend to some degree on the bargaining skills of manage-
ment. The estimated value of the acquired bank, V(B), should represent
the minimum price that A would have to pay for the bank. However, A
and B may have different estimates of relative value, especially in those
instances where there is no active market in B's stock. If the manage-
ment of A can convince the management of B that their bank is worth
less than its true value, the acquisition could be profitable to A even
though there are no synergies or other advantages caused by the
merger.35
It is possible that there are benefits to be shared by both A and B.
The upward range in price would be determined by the incremental value
that Firm B brings to the new combination firm, AB. This is defined as
V(AB) - V(A). If this value is larger than the independent value of B,
V(B), synergies exist. If the price were set at the incremental value of
firm B, all of the benefits of the transaction would go to the acquired
firm's shareholders, and none to the shareholders of the acquiring firm.
The greater is V(AB) - V(A), the greater are the synergistic benefits of
the merger and the more likely the merger is to occur. High incremental
values provide greater room for negotiation, and increase the possibility
that the owners of both firms will benefit.
It is possible that the price paid will exceed V(AB) - V(A). This
33. Of 14,000 banks, only about 300 firms have their stock traded on organized exchanges.
34. For an elaboration, see Heggestad, Fundamentals of Mergers and Acquisitions, in
HANDBOOK FOR BANKING STRATEGY 703 (1985).
35. This could occur if no active market in the stock of the bank exists, and the owners of
the acquired bank miscalculate their bank's future earnings. Also, this situation would result
only if there are a small number of potential acquiring firms, so that the acquiring bank has
some monopolistic power. In a perfectly competitive market for acquisitions, no transaction in
which the acquired bank was sold below its market value would be possible since the price
would be bid up to that level by competing firms.
1985] 1175
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
could occur for two reasons. First, these valuations are based upon ex-
pected future values. Management of A could have either overestimated
V(AB) or underestimated their own value, V(A), and paid too much.
Alternatively, they could have overpaid because they are not following a
strategy designed to maximize the value of their firms. If management's
incentive is to maximize growth, to maximize sales or to insure their
continued employment, they may be willing to pay excess premiums for
mergers.36
Of course, managers cannot continually follow a strategy of paying
more than incremental value for acquired firms since they are effectively
transferring wealth from their own shareholders to those of the acquired
firm. This will ultimately drive down the value of their own shares and is
likely to lead either to their removal from management or to a takeover
offer for their bank by some potential acquirer that discovers the under-
valued stock.
B. Sources of Synergy
There are several potential sources of gains that would cause the
value of the combined firm to increase relative to the value of the sepa-
rate entities-[V(AB)--V(A) + V(B)]. This effect is referred to an syn-
ergy. Possible sources of synergy include:
(1) Greater efficiency-On a combined basis, the firms achieve im-
portant economies of scale or scope. They need less resources to produce
the same output as they are able to integrate production facilities or use
more efficient methods;
(2) Financial Economies-The new firm has access to financial
markets that were not available to one or both of the smaller firms. The
cost of capital falls below premerger levels. For example, the combined
firm may have a lower probability of bankruptcy than the two separate
firms if the cash flows of the two firms are not perfectly positively corre-
lated. Recognizing this, lenders may require a lower return reducing the
cost of capital;
(3) Market power-The combined firm may have additional mar-
ket power. It may be able to increase its prices relative to its costs be-
cause of a reduction in competition. The market would recognize this by
increasing the value of the combined firm;
(4) Tax incentives-The acquired firm may have tax credits that it
is not able to use directly, perhaps because it will not generate sufficient
profits as an independent to recoup past losses. As part of a larger firm,
36. See S. RHOADES, POWER, EMPIRE BUILDING, AND MERGERS (1983).
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it may be able to recoup loss carryforwards immediately, increasing the
present value of the tax benefits; and
(5) Evasion of regulation-In a heavily regulated industry, such as
commercial banking, mergers may provide a mechanism to avoid regula-
tions. For example, if the law prohibits de novo interstate banking but
permits expansion by acquisition, there may be an increase in the value of
the acquiring firm as a result of the expansion because potential competi-
tors may be excluded from entering the market.
IV. MOTIVES FOR COMMERCIAL BANK MERGERS
This section considers in more detail a number of the potential bene-
fits to commercial banks from acquisitions. Given the banking environ-
ment, several benefits will be of considerable importance.
A. Economic Synergies
1. Economies of scale
One of the most commonly stated motives for acquisitions is the
opportunity to exploit economies of scale. Economies of scale are en-
joyed whenever the average unit cost of production declines as produc-
tion increases. Recent studies of banking firms suggest that the average
cost curves of banks tends to be U-shaped and that most economies of
scale are exhausted when banks reach a deposit size in the range of $25 to
$50 million.37 Appendix D presents the size distribution of deposits for
United States banking organizations in 1983. Of the 14,500 commercial
banks, over 10,000 are below the critical fifty million size. Thus, for
seventy-two percent of the commercial banks, there are potential syner-
gistic benefits for combination by achieving some economies of scale.
However, the larger merger transactions are not motivated by potential
economies of scale.38 In fact, an upward sloped average cost curve for
37. See, ag., Benston, Hanweck & Humphrey, Scale Economies in Banking: A Restructur-
ing and Reassessment, 14 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 435 (1982) (Part 1). The results of
these studies differ from the majority of earlier findings regarding bank economies of scale,
which almost uniformly concluded that the that the production of banking services was char-
acterized by economies of scale. However, recent studies have convincingly demonstrated
that earlier results are largely due to misspecification of the production function. For a lucid
criticism of the economies of scale literature in banking, see Humphrey, Costs and Scale Econ-
omies in Bank Intermediation, in HANDBOOK FOR BANKING STRATEGY 745 (1985).
38. One unresolved question is whether these results can be extended to the very largest
banking firms. The disaggregated technical approaches to estimating scale economies in bank-
ing use date from the Federal Reserve's Functional Cost Program. Larger banks have not
participated in this program.
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larger firms would be a negative factor in larger mergers. The increase in
production costs would have to be offset by other factors.
2. Economies of scope
The concept of economies of scale technically applies to a single
product firm. Other operating efficiencies may arise in a multiproduct
firm due to cost complementaries.39 Cost complementaries, in turn, give
rise to economies of scope, which exist whenever it is less costly to com-
bine two or more product lines in one firm than to produce these prod-
ucts separately. Economies of scope imply cost savings associated with
joint production and may arise, for example, when inputs are shared or
utilized jointly in separate functions.
Scope economies are potentially significant in banking. For exam-
ple, credit analyses on loan applications are less costly when customers
have deposit relationships with the bank. Physical plant and equipment
is jointly utilized by several functions. Automated Teller Machines
(ATMs) are utilized for cash dispensing, deposit taking, statement verifi-
cation and account transfers. Statistically, significant scope economies
have been found although the magnitude of such scope effects is quan-
titatively small.' Nevertheless, such economies may offset to some ex-
tent the diseconomies associated with bank scale.
3. Technological synergies
Although unresolved, another issue associated with economies of
scale in banking is that certain technological and productivity enhance-
ments may only be economically feasible for larger institutions.41 These
39. Cost complementarity is said to exist whenever the costs of producing a particular
commodity vary with respect to the output levels of the other commodities produced by the
firm. See Panzar & Willig, Economies of Scale on Multi-Output Production, 91 Q.J. ECON. 481
(1977).
40. Studies regarding scope economies in banking include Gilligan, Smirlock & Marshall,
Scale and Scope Economies in the Multi-Product Banking Firm, 13 J. MONETARY EON. 393
(1984), and Benston, Berger, Hanweck & Humphrey, Economies of Scale and Scope in Bank-
ing, in PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE ON BANK STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION (May,
1983) (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago). For a study which found economies of scope in
Canadian credit union operations, see Murray & White, Economies of Scale and Economies of
Scope in Multiproduct Financial Institutions: A Study of British Columbia Credit Unions, 38 J.
FIN. 887 (1983).
41. The issue is whether superior technologies are feasible only for larger banking firms. If
so, average costs, at some level of scale, could flatten or decline, as a different technology was
implemented. Even though continued expansion using existing technology may result in dis-
economies of scale, shifting to a different technology could create additional operating cost
savings. The fact is that there has been a significant change in the technology available for
bank payments and delivery systems. For a discussion of this issue in the context of the results
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new products and activities may either create additional cost comple-
mentaries with other activities, but only at a sufficiently large scale, or
they may have product specific economies of scale over a wider range of
firm size. Studies of ATMs and cash dispensers show that high volumes
are required in order to produce cost savings over conventional delivery
systems. Likewise, electronic payments at automated clearing houses
have been shown to have scale economies, whereas check processing
seems to be subject to diseconomies of scale. Many of the newer techno-
logical developments have the potential to reduce the operating costs as-
sociated with the delivery of financial services. Apparently, these
innovations are efficient only at a scale larger than the most efficient scale
of more conventional bank delivery and payments systems ($50 million).
Consequently, acquiring firms may perceive that mergers provide a
method to capture these potential "technological" synergies.
4. Inefficient management
Another motive for bank mergers is the opportunity to replace inept
or inefficient management operations. A poorly managed firm will have
a depressed value relative to its potential value. As a result, its earnings
will also be depressed. If it can eliminate inefficiencies, the acquiring firm
should be able to capture the increase in value and earnings.
Although existing management of an inefficiently run firm could be
replaced by existing shareholders, the process is not automatic or easy.
Moreover, in banking, the Change in Bank Control Act of 197842 and the
Change in Savings and Loan Control Act of 1978,43 which require prior
notice to the regulatory authorities before obtaining twenty-five percent
or more of a firm's stock, make unfriendly takeovers more difficult. A
merger often offers a less costly option for existing shareholders to elimi-
nate inefficiencies or replace management. Depending on the bidding
process, mergers may permit existing shareholders to capture some of the
expected future benefits of more efficient operations. The acquiring firm
should obtain at least part of the synergies due to more efficient
management.44
on economies of scale, see Humphrey, supra note 37, at 745. Humphrey concludes that some
of these developments have the potential to significantly reduce the costs associated with pay-
ments and delivery systems. However, the benefits from these technological developments
have not occurred rapidly and are unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future. Humphrey
therefore concluded that the results regarding the lack of economies of scale for larger banking
firms will remain valid for some time.
42. 12 U.S.C. § 1817 (1982).
43. 12 U.S.C. § 1730 (1982).
44. Although we are unaware of studies in banking focusing on mergers and management
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This particular motive may be of increasing importance to banking
firms today. Historically, banks have operated under regulations
designed to restrict competition and prevent bank failure. If these regu-
lations created monopoly rents in banking, management may have had
the opportunity to divert some of these rents from the owners either in
the form of non-pecuniary compensation, reduced risk or abnormal sala-
ries.4" As deregulation and competition increase, however, monopoly
rents will decline, placing greater pressure on management to behave effi-
ciently. If unable to do so, the value of firms should reflect the poorer
quality management and create more opportunities for mergers designed
to eliminate such inefficiencies.
5. Increases in market power
Horizontal mergers, by definition, reduce the number of independ-
ent competitors in the market and increase the market share of the ac-
quiring firm. This may enhance the firm's monopoly power. In this case,
the synergistic benefits are increased profitability resulting from higher
loan rates or reduced deposit rates. This should not be a major factor
since mergers that lead to significant increases in market share are likely
to be prevented by the banking authorities. Moreover, substantial mo-
nopoly rents are likely to be competed away by the potential competition
and the entry of both bank and non-bank competitors.
Indeed, according to the contestable market thesis, market share
and high concentration per se do not imply market power.46 As long as
entry is costless, firms operating in the market must take into account
potential competitors. They will behave as if they were operating in per-
fectly competitive markets. This model implies that mergers should not
result in increased monopoly power. The contestable market model is
receiving considerable attention in the legal and economic literature.
However, its assumption are very restrictive and may not be fully appli-
quality, there is some corroborating evidence from the non-banking sector. Ellert found that
investors in acquired firms earned relatively low rates of return some years prior to acquisition.
In the months immediately preceding the takeover, the price of the stock increased somewhat,
reflecting the anticipated premium paid to the selling firm. These results are generally consis-
tent with the poor management hypothesis. See Ellert, Mergers, Antitrust Law Enforcement
and Stockholder Returns, 31 J. FIN. 715 (1976).
45. See, e.g., Edwards & Heggestad, Uncertainty, Market Structure, and Performance:
The Galbraith-Caves Hypothesis and Managerial Motives in Banking, 87 Q.J. ECON. 455
(1973); Edwards, Managerial Objectives in Regulated Industries: Expense-Preference Behavior
in Banking, 85 J. POL. ECON. 147 (1977); Hannan, Expense-Preference Behavior in Banking: A
Reexamination, 87 J. POL. ECON. 891 (1979).
46. W. BAUMOL, J. PANZAR & R. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY
OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982).
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cable to an industry such as commercial banking. For example, the the-
ory requires instantaneous and costless entry and exit, which is certainly
not appropriate for banking markets.
Because entry in banking is not totally costless nor instantaneous,
some banks may perceive that there are monopoly rents associated with
larger market share, even if these rents are only transitory.47 Although
there is no direct evidence (nor would it be easy to obtain) regarding the
validity of this motive, there is a large body of empirical literature in
banking suggesting that banks with larger market shares, or banks oper-
ating in markets with fewer competitors, ceterisparibus, are more profita-
ble than those banks operating in more competitive markets."a
6. Vertical integration
In vertical mergers, the acquiring firm expands along the production
process either forward to the customer or backward to the supplier. This
integration may facilitate coordination and administration of the produc-
tion process. It may provide greater control over suppliers, eliminate
potential bottlenecks in the production process, reduce contracting and
monitoring costs, facilitate planning and remove uncertainties associated
with supply deliveries. In banking, the benefits of such mergers are likely
to accrue more often to a bank holding company expanding into closely
related financial areas than to a banking subsidiary merging directly with
47. Related to increasing market share is the desire to acquire established firms in different
banking markets. Relative to de novo entry, such acquisitions may reduce the time and pro-
motional expenses required to build a clientele and to reduce the uncertainty associated with
establishing the market presence. However, while this may be a motive for expansion, such
acquisitions are not likely to create synergistic benefits. The value of the acquired firm should
reflect its existing market presence and the opportunity costs associated with establishing that
position. However, recent changes in antitrust policy may have increased the number of per-
missible combinations and reduced certain acquisition costs associated with antitrust enforce-
ment. See Guerin-Calvert, supra note 15.
48. For a comprehensive summary of these findings which are associated with the struc-
ture-performance paradigm, see S. RHOADES, STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE STUDIES IN
BANKING: A SUMMARY AND EVALUATION, Staff Economic Study No. 92 (1977) (Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System); S. RHOADES, STRUCTURE-PERFORMANCE STUD-
IES IN BANKING: AN UPDATED SUMMARY AND EVALUATION, Staff Economic Study No. 119
(1982) (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). Generally, these studies find a
significant relationship between concentration and profitability. However, an alternative view
is that these results do not imply a relationship between monopoly power and profitability.
High market shares can occur as a result of efficiency as well as market power. See Demsetz,
Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy, 16 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1973). For a recent
critique of the structure-performance studies in banking, see Gilbert, Bank Market Structure
and Competition: A Survey, 16 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 617 (1984). One of the criti-
cisms made is that even when significant relationships are found between market structure and
profitability, such relationships are quantitatively small. Hence, even if there are monopoly
rents associated with market concentration, they may not be very large.
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another banking subsidiary. However, there may be some opportunities
for such economies across banking firms. Banks may specialize in differ-
ent portions of the financial intermediation process. A bank chartered in
a deposit-rich state may be able to integrate the deposit gathering with
lending in some other market area. 9 Such mergers may also permit
banks to acquire data processing facilities, electronic funds transfer re-
sources, check clearing facilities and to integrate some of the correspon-
dent banking functions into a single entity. Banks without branch
networks might acquire such delivery systems through merger. These
acquisitions may generate synergistic benefits.
B. Financial Synergies
1. Diversification
The combination of two separate firms will increase the diversifica-
tion of the firm's assets and its deposit or funding base. As long as the
two firms do not have perfect positive correlation in their cash flows, the
variability of the cash flows available to investors will be reduced. It
particularly is likely that geographic diversification of banking firms' as-
sets will reduce the variability of their cash flows. Banks operate in lo-
cally limited markets.5 0 Deposit supply functions are related to local
economies. Consequently, deposit supply varies independently for firms
operating in different markets.
Similarly, there is potential to reduce the variability of returns on
loans. A widely diversified loan portfolio is less sensitive to local
problems. A locally limited bank may have a high concentration of its
loans devoted to a common local industry or to the agricultural sector.
By diversifying across several markets, the bank is less sensitive to local
shocks.51
49. Regulations on affiliate transactions limit the extent of such vertical economies. The
Garn-St Germain Act of 1982 liberalized permissible transactions between banking affiliates
and between banking firms and their subsidiaries. See Rose & Talley, The Banking Affiliates
Act of 1982: Amendments to Section 23A, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 693 (1982). Transactions between
banks and non-bank subsidiaries of bank holding companies are somewhat more limited,
Hence, if "non-bank" banks are viewed as non-banking subsidiaries, regulations may restrict
these possibilities.
50. Nearly all empirical research on banking firms consider banking markets as locally
limited. For a review of banking market determination, see J. WOLKEN, GEOGRAPHIC MAR-
KET DELINEATION: A REvIEw OF THE LITERATURE, Staff Study No. 140 (1984) (Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
51. For a similar view regarding bank holding company expansion, see Smirlock & Brown,
Multibank Holding Company Expansion and Cash Flow Diversification as a Motive for Merger,
in PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE ON BANK STRucruRE AND COMPETITION 424 (May
1984) (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago).
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The reduced variability is definitely in the interest of depositors and
other creditors of the firm as the probability of default falls.5 2 The reduc-
tion of risk may also be in the interest of stockholders. In an efficient
financial market, it has been shown that the shareholders will not pay a
premium for reduced risk in cash flows as investors are able to reduce
their own risk directly by buying shares in many independent firms.
However, the stock of most commercial banks is not traded on organized
exchanges. Many bank stocks are closely held and seldom traded. Con-
sequently, it would be costly and difficult for individual investors to de-
velop a diversified portfolio of bank stocks. However, a bank holding
company may achieve this diversification by acquiring independent
banks operating in a wide variety of markets. In this industry, the mar-
ket may well place a premium on the stock of diversified companies since
they have achieved a risk return configuration that is not available to
individual investors.
Banks have generally attempted to achieve diversification synergies
through acquisition rather than through de novo growth. The reason for
this stems from bank regulations. Not all banking firms have equal ac-
cess to all geographic markets. Most banks are not permitted to acquire
banks across state lines and, in many states, banks can only expand geo-
graphically through the holding company organization. Hence, regula-
tions create incentives to expand through acquisitions rather than
through expansion of the existing firm (such as branching). Synergies
exist because banks which are locally limited are likely to be valued dif-
ferently than banks that are able to make acquisitions over wider geo-
graphic areas. The fact that restrictions on geographic expansion limit
the number of potential bidders for any locally limited bank may cause
the market value of these banks to be depressed.
Banks unconstrained geographically may be able to take advantage
of these potential synergies. This would imply, for example, that
grandfathered interstate bank holding companies have greater synergies
available to them than non-interstate bank holding companies, even
though both types of organizations may operate in several markets.5 3
In addition to geographic diversification, larger banks are able to
offer a wider range of products and services than smaller banks. These
52. See Galai & Masulis, The Option Pricing Model and the Risk Factor of Stock, 3 J. FIN.
ECON. 53 (1976).
53. There is a limited evidence for such synergies. See A. HEGGESrAD, D. SHONE & J.
WOLKEN, SYNERGIES IN INTERSTATE BANKING: PRELIMINARY RESULTS (Oct. 12, 1984)
(paper presented at the Financial Management Association Meetings, Toronto, Canada) [here-
inafter cited as A. HEGGESTAD]
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firms are also able to diversify domestically and internationally. Such
diversification may also reduce uncertainties regarding income flows and
hence reduce the riskiness of the bank vis-a-vis smaller firms.1
4
2. Financial economies
There may be certain financial benefits associated with larger size.
Larger banks may face lower costs for purchased funds (certificates of
deposit, federal funds and Eurodollars) and have access to lower cost
debt and equity. These benefits are partially due to transaction costs and
partially because larger banks may be perceived as being somewhat less
risky. The fact that it is widely felt that the regulators will not let larger
banks fail means that effectively all deposit liabilities of larger banks are
insured. This de facto insurance may in turn reduce the cost of the "un-
insured" liabilities of the larger banks.5
Larger banks appear to be able to operate with greater leverage
without regulatory interference. If true, then combining the resources of
two banks permits additional expansion without the banks having to
raise more equity capital. These banks are able to use greater propor-
tions of lower cost deposits and debt relative to expensive equity capital
to finance their operations. Thus, their costs of funds should be lower
than that of smaller firms.
Lastly, it should be easier for larger banks to raise equity. Many
smaller banks are unlisted corporations or closely held companies whose
stocks trade infrequently. Consequently, there is much uncertainty re-
garding the value of their stocks. This limits the marketability of the
firm's stock and may increase the costs of equity capital for these compa-
nies should the need arise. In contrast, the stock of most larger banks is
listed on the major stock exchanges and is traded quite frequently. This
should enhance their access to the equity markets.
54. For a study which found some evidence consistent with synergies from product differ-
entiation, see Swary, Bank Acquisition of Non-Bank Firms: An Empirical Analysis of Adminis-
trative Decisions, 7 J. BANKING & FIN. 213 (1983). Swary found that positive abnormal
returns followed the announcement of the acquisition of a non-bank subsidiary.
55. Without the insurance argument, the ability for larger firms to borrow at lower cost is
the result of the efficient bond markets, and not due to any financial synergies. See Galai &
Masulis, supra note 52. In R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE
710 (1984), the authors argue that mergers increase bond values and therefore decrease the
interest payments necessary to support a given bond only by reducing the value of the stock-
holders' option to default. When two firms merge, the fact that two parties guarantee the debt
is the reason for the lower interest rate. However, the authors also point out that, if the merger
permits increased borrowing and increased value from tax benefits, there may be a net gain
from the merger. Larger banks, as discussed below, do operate with higher degrees of
leverage.
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If such financial economies exist, then these larger corporations
should be more profitable, less risky, or both. The evidence supporting
the existence of financial economies for larger banking firms is, however,
somewhat inconclusive. 6
From 1979 to 1983, net income (after taxes and securities gains or
losses) for large money center banks averaged 0.53% of assets.57 Return
on assets for all commercial banks with assets less than $100 million av-
eraged 1.104% of assets.5" Hence, on the basis of return on assets,
smaller banks were more profitable than large money center banks.
Money center banks were much more leveraged than smaller banks.
Over the same five year period, the ratio of assets to equity for money
center banks averaged 24.87, whereas banks with assets less than $100
million had equity multipliers which averaged 11.85.19 Return, as a per-
cent of equity for these two groups of banks, was 13.2% and 13.16%
respectively.' Thus, after accounting for differences in leverage, large
money center banks and smaller banks on average are equally profitable.
Over the same period, however, return on equity of money center banks
varied somewhat less than that of smaller banks. The standard deviation
of return on equity is .96% for money center banks and 1.12% for banks
with assets less than $100 million.61 Hence, these results suggest that if
profitability is measured in terms of return on equity, money center
banks and small commercial banks are equally profitable, although the
return on equity of money center banks was less variable, at least over
the 1979 to 1983 period. On net, the economic diseconomies of scale
which apparently exist for larger banks are offset to some extent by the
financial economies and the availability of greater leverage.
3. Tax considerations
Owners who have their wealth tied up in closely held, infrequently
traded firms face two problems. First, their wealth may be tied up in a
non-diversified investment and in one whose market value is only infre-
quently assessed. The latter condition may significantly impair the li-
quidity of their investment. Second, even if the stock of the firm could be
easily sold, these owners may face significant tax liabilities. If they were
unable to exchange their stock for the stock of a more diversified (with
56. See Danker & McLaughlin, Profitability of Insured Commercial Banks in 1983, 70
Fed. Res. Bull. 802 (1984).
57. Id. at 809 (Table 7).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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regard to area, product, or both) banking concern's stock, they possibly
could gain greater liquidity and a more diversified portfolio, and they
perhaps could avoid capital gains taxes that otherwise would be assessed.
Acquiring firms may thus be able to capture part of the value of the
potential tax liability. And even without the tax advantage, the lack of
liquidity could induce the acquiring firm's owners to sacrifice some
wealth in exchange for greater liquidity.
C. Non-synergistic Merger Motives
1. Bargaining
Any merger ultimately involves a bidding process between the ac-
quiring firm and the acquired firm. Even if there are not synergies from
the merger, the acquiring firm or the acquired firm may feel it is the
better bargainer and is able to capture more than the market value of the
firm through the bargaining process.
In efficient markets, there should be no discrepancy between the
asking and selling price. The firm to be acquired should simply sell at its
market value. However, the assumption of efficient markets may be less
tenable when there are few potential buyers and sellers.
The banking industry may be characterized as an industry with few
potential merger partners. Potential banking acquisitions are limited by
branching laws, holding company acquisition laws and antitrust laws.
Moreover, only banking organizations (banks or bank holding compa-
nies) generally can acquire banking firms. 2 This is not true in other in-
dustries. Consequently, price determination in bank mergers essentially
may be bilateral bargaining situations. Firms which believe they are bet-
ter bargainers may perceive that there are gains from acquisition, other
than synergies, from being able to acquire the firm at a price less than the
firm's true market value.
2. Avoiding regulation and reducing regulatory uncertainty
Some mergers may be stimulated by a desire to capture rents associ-
ated with regulatory avoidance. We have already discussed cases where
mergers permit circumvention of geographic restrictions (and the capture
62. Some exceptions to this rule have occurred, but they are rare, especially since the
passage of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendment of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, § 103,
84 Stat. 1760 (applicable provisions are codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1982)). In a
few instances, non-bank firms have acquired chartered banks through the non-bank loophole
in the Bank Holding Company Act.
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of the benefits associated with this diversification), differential capital
standards between large and small banks and de facto deposit insurance.
Other mergers which seem to have been motivated by the desire to
circumvent regulations include acquisitions of limited purpose banks lo-
cated in states which have different powers than those of nationally
chartered banks or other state chartered banks. Such expansion has per-
mitted some banking firms to engage in a more diversified set of activi-
ties, such as insurance and real estate development, or has allowed them
to avoid ceilings and credit card fee limitations.
There is another element of regulation that may motivate mergers as
well. In an environment which is in a state of flux, due to economic and
regulatory developments, firms may desire to reduce the uncertainty as-
sociated with future regulatory changes. For example, the current regu-
latory policy regarding bank acquisitions and antitrust policy is fairly
well understood. In bank mergers, markets are defined as consisting of
banks (or banks and thrifts), and concentration and market shares are
evaluated in the context of a local geographic market. Yet, there are
signs that markets may be increasing in geographic size, and debate con-
tinues regarding the appropriate definition of the line of commerce or
product line. As long as the rules regarding bank mergers remain un-
changed, it is fairly simple to evaluate the likelihood of an antitrust chal-
lenge. Trying to project when, how and if the antitrust enforcement will
be modified is difficult. Hence, mergers which occur today are easier to
evaluate. In addition, it is unlikely that acquisitions which are permitted
today will have to be divested in the future.63
A similar phenomena exists regarding interstate expansion and non-
bank bank acquisitions. The non-bank bank loophole exists in 1985.
Most believe that eventually interstate banking in some form will be ap-
proved. However, in the interim, the non-bank bank loophole may be
closed. Consequently, in order to reduce the uncertainty and to position
the bank for the future world of interstate banking, mergers or acquisi-
tions of non-bank firms may be desirable.
63. As an illustration of the uncertainty, consider a bank which contemplates acquiring
another bank located in an adjacent county. Today, such a merger is likely to be viewed as a
market extension merger and subject to less regulatory scrutiny than would a similar horizon-
tal merger. If the market were redefined to encompass both counties, the proposed merger
would become a horizontal merger and would have to pass the market concentration tests of
such mergers. It is possible that under the new market definition, the proposed merger could
be denied on horizontal grounds. Although the effect of a specific acquisition depends on the
uncertain market definition, by merging today, the acquiring bank eliminates this uncertainty.
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V. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE BENEFITS OF MERGERS
There has been considerable attention in finance to the benefits of
mergers and acquisitions. 6" This section discusses the likely benefits both
to acquiring and to acquired firms of mergers and acquisitions among
nonfinancial entities. Next, this section articulates why the unique na-
ture of the banking industry may allow banking firms to obtain, by the
acquisition of other banking entities, benefits not associated with acquisi-
tions in other industries.
A. Mergers in the Corporate Sector
The most significant study of the impact of all corporate mergers
was made by Mandelker.65 Mandelker concluded that owners of ac-
quired firms received premiums for their stocks. This suggests that their
stock has greater value when acquired than when it was part of an in-
dependent firm. However, the shareholders of acquiring firms competed
for these benefits against several other firms. The net effect was that, on
average, shareholders of acquiring firms received no net benefit from ac-
quisitions of their companies. They did not lose, however, which sug-
gests that they paid competitive prices.
This result was supported by several more recent studies, such as
those by Ellert in 1975, Langtieg in 1978 and Malatesta in 1982.66 These
representative studies used different statistical techniques, different as-
sumptions about when the financial markets became aware of the merger
and different samples of mergers and acquisitions. All of the studies
found financial gains from mergers. Whatever the source of the gain,
there appeared to be some unique value in the acquired firms that could
only be captured by merger or acquisition. However, the gains did not
appear to go to the acquiring firms, implying that there had been a suffi-
cient number of acquiring firms in the market so that the potential in-
creased value was bid into the acquisition price.
B. Banking Mergers Compared to Mergers of Nonfinancial Firms
The evidence in finance suggests strongly that there are generally
64. For an excellent survey of the critical issues regarding the benefits of mergers, see
Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN.
ECON. 5 (1983).
65. Mandelker, Risk and Return: The Case of Merging Firms, 1 J. FIN. ECON, 303 (1974).
66. Ellert, Mergers, Antitrust Law Enforcement and the Stockholder Returns, 31 J. FIN.
715 (1976); Langetieg, An Application of a Three-Factor Performance Index to Measure Stock-
holder Gains from Merger, 6 J. FiN. ECON. 365 (1978); Malatesta, The Wealth Effect of Merger
Activity and the Objective Functions of Merging Firms, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 155 (1982).
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benefits to be derived from mergers. However, the benefits apparently
accrue to the shareholders of the acquired firms because competition
among acquiring firms increases the acquisition price and eliminates the
potential benefits to the ultimate buyers.
However, commercial banking may be different in this regard. Be-
cause the regulatory framework significantly has distorted banking oper-
ations, the pool for potential buyers for any given merger is fairly small.
There are a number of reasons for this. First, the acquiring firm cannot
have nonfinancial operations. An acquisition of a bank by a retailing or
manufacturing firm would be illegal under the Bank Holding Company
Amendment of 1970. Second, the pool of potential acquiring banking
organizations is also limited because generally the acquiring firm must
also be located in the same state and the merger must pass antitrust con-
siderations. Third, the merger must pass regulatory restrictions on the
financial terms of the merger.
Moreover, mergers among banking firms may provide the acquiring
bank with benefits not associated with mergers among non-financial cor-
porations, if the merger allows the bank to avoid limitations on multi-
office operations. Banks are sharply limited in their ability to operate
outside of their home state. Additionally, many states limit the ability of
banks to expand across their home state. As a consequence, there are too
many banking organizations in the United States, most of which are too
small to be efficient. They are certainly too small to benefit from any
economies that may exist from multi-office operations. As discussed
above, these include lower deposit variability, possible lower marginal
costs of funds and a greater opportunity to diversify their loan portfolios.
C. Evidence of Interstate Synergies
Some evidence regarding synergies resulting from interstate banking
has recently been collected in a study by Heggestad, Shome and
Wolken. 7 The purpose of this study was to develop a model to estimate
the potential synergistic benefits captured by firms which were permitted
to operate interstate banking firms either by virtue of their grandfathered
status (i.e., they were operating banks interstate prior to the passage of
the Douglas Amendment in 1956) or because they are operated banks in
states which recently have relaxed restrictions regarding interstate bank
acquisitions. Because interstate companies operate in clearly separate
markets, any synergies that exist are likely to be financial. If financial
67. A. HEGGESTAD, supra note 53.
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synergies are important, they will exist for all mergers in banking and
will prove to be an important motivating force.
The technique utilized in the paper was an modification of the Pure
Play techniques widely used in value estimation for firms without traded
securities.6" A valuation model was estimated from a sample of banking
firms operating in a single state over the 1978 to 1982 period. This model
was then used to estimate the value of the banking subsidiaries of the
interstate banking firms. These estimates were necessary to obtain the
market value of banking subsidiaries controlled by bank holding compa-
nies, since these subsidiaries' stocks do not generally trade independently
of the stock of the holding company. The assumption made is that these
estimates represent the value of the banking subsidiary if it was part of an
organization operating in a single state.
If synergies exist, then the sum of the estimated market values of the
subsidiaries should be less than the market value of the consolidated par-
ent holding company. Although the results of this study are preliminary,
the findings suggested that on average there are some synergies associ-
ated with interstate banking operations. The relative values varied from
different banks and time periods. Because of the estimation technique,
quantitative estimates of the size of synergies were not obtained. Future
work is being conducted to measure the magnitude of the reasons behind
these differences.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This Article has considered the current merger movement in com-
mercial banking from the viewpoint of the industry and from the view-
point of public policy. The Article discusses the incentives for mergers
and acquisitions and points out that they are quite varied in nature. Sev-
eral conclusions seem to be evident from the analysis:
1. Deregulation will continue to put pressure on many firms in the
industry to join larger institutions.
2. The disappearance of a large number of small firms through
mergers and acquisitions is not necessarily undesirable. There are too
many banks in the United States. There are over 10,000 commercial
banks that have not achieved minimal optimal size. When thrifts that
offer virtually similar products are considered, the problem is further
complicated. Mergers reflect a rational way to consolidate an unnatural
68. See Fuller & Kerr, Estimating the Divisional Cost of Capital: An Analysis of the Pure-
Play Technique, 36 J. FiN. 997 (1981).
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industry structure that has grown out of the past regulatory
environment.
3. Financial economies are more likely in mergers of banks than in
mergers of non-financial corporations. Since banks are so highly lever-
aged, any reduction in the probability of default on debt that lowers the
required return on debt will substantially increase profitability.
4. There may be non-economic factors involved in many mergers
because management may be willing to pay a premium for growth in
order to maximize firm size.
5. Since many mergers provide a vehicle to avoid regulatory limi-
tations on geographic expansion, they will probably provide significant
synergies. This result is considerably more likely than mergers in unreg-
ulated industries where management is free to choose its optimal geo-
graphic setting and product mix and need not rely on acquisition.
6. Initial evidence suggests that there is considerable value to oper-
ating across wide geographic markets. This is consistent with the con-
cept of synergistic mergers.
7. The public and private interest is well served by a liberal regula-
tory position on mergers. These acquisitions have proved to be profitable
for shareholders and provide a smooth transition to a more rational fi-
nancial structure. Other than mergers that lead to direct reduction in
competition, there is no public policy ground to restrict mergers further
under the current environment.
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Appendix A
Number of Bank Acquisitions
(1960-1983)
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0 0
60 63 66 69 72 75 78 81 Year
Source: S. RHOADES, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS BY COMMERCIAL BANKS 1960-83, Staff
Studies No. 142 (1984) (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
Appendix B
Value of Acquired Banks
(1960-1983)
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Source: S. RHOADES, MERGERS AND AcQuISITIONS BY COMMERCIAL BANKS 1960-83, Staff
Studies No. 142 (1984) (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
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Appendix C
Sources of Funds-United States Commercial Banks
(Percent)
1950 1960 1970
Demand Deposits 69.7 60.1 42.8
Time and Savings Deposits 21.9 28.3 40.7
Other Liabilities 1.6 3.5 9.1
Capital 6.9 8.1 7.4
Total 100.0 100.0
1983
16.6
48.9
28.5
6.0
100.0100.0
Source: Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System.
Appendix D
Deposit Distribution-United States Commercial Banks
June 30, 1983
Size of Bank
(millions)
0-9.9
10-24.9
25-49.9
50-99.9
100-499.9
500-999.9
1,000 or more
Number of
Banks
2,294
4,481
3,657
2,233
1,500
168
188
Number of
Banking
Offices
2,528
6,250
7,543
7,050
11,196
4,249
16,104
Percent of
Banks
15.8
30.9
25.2
15.4
10.3
1.2
1.3
Percent of
Total Deposits
1.0
5.2
8.9
10.5
19.5
8.1
46.8
Source: FEDERAL DEPosrr INSURANCE CORPORATION, DATA BOOK: OPERATING BANKS
AND BRANCHES (June 30, 1983).

